Earn in everything you already do.

ALLI is a fixed-supply BEP-20 token that pays people for activity they already perform - a walk, a game session, and in time a purchase - and settles those rewards on a public chain rather than in a private ledger.

Loyalty programmes have solved the incentive problem and failed the ownership one. Points, miles and in-app credits are liabilities on someone else's balance sheet: they expire, they are revalued without notice, they cannot leave the issuer, and the holder cannot audit how many exist. ALLI takes the same behavioural mechanics and moves the unit of account onto BNB Smart Chain, where the supply is fixed at ten billion tokens by a contract with no mint function, the code is verified byte-for-byte on BscScan, and the balance sits in a wallet the earner controls.

Two applications are live. Aura Run rewards a GPS-verified daily walk in ALLI. EggoWorld, a collectible pet game, is named by the project as the second paying application, though its public marketplace is not yet visibly ALLI-denominated - a discrepancy set out in §4.1. A third, Plant-to-Earn, is in development. Two further pillars - a marketplace and a Visa-linked AlliCard - are stated direction, not shipped product, and are labelled as such throughout.

This document sets out the ecosystem as it actually stands, specifies the token, and proposes the economic model the ecosystem needs to survive its own emission schedule. It is deliberately explicit about four things that are not finished: there is no third-party contract audit, the contract retains an owner key, circulating supply is not yet published wallet-by-wallet, and the relationship between advertised reward values and the emission budget requires reconciliation. Each is treated in full rather than omitted.

Every reward you have ever earned for ordinary activity was an IOU you could not verify, could not move, and could not price.

Loyalty currencies are among the largest unregulated liability pools in consumer finance. Airline miles, retailer points, step-count credits and in-app coins share a structure: the issuer creates the unit at zero cost, decides unilaterally what it is worth, decides when it expires, and confines it to a closed redemption catalogue. The holder has no claim, no audit trail, and no exit.

Move-to-earn and play-to-earn applications inherited the same defect in blockchain clothing. Many credit an off-chain point balance that may convert to a token later, subject to conditions the operator can change. The user is told they are earning an asset; what they hold is a promise.

Four failures ALLI is built against

• Unverifiable issuance. No holder of a points balance can determine how many points exist. ALLI's total supply is a public integer, readable by anyone, and the contract exposes no function that can raise it.
• Silent devaluation. Programmes routinely reprice redemption rates overnight. A fixed supply removes issuance as a devaluation lever; it does not remove market risk, which is addressed in §13.
• Non-portability. Points die inside the issuer's walls. ALLI is a standard BEP-20 token: transferable, tradeable and self-custodiable from the moment it is credited.
• Deferred settlement. "Points now, tokens later" concentrates counterparty risk at exactly the moment the operator is least able to bear it. ALLI is credited as a token, on-chain, from the first step.

Four commitments govern how the ecosystem is built and how this document is written.

3.1 On-chain from the first step

Rewards are denominated and settled in a token that exists on a public chain, not in an internal point ledger with a promise attached. What a user earns can be inspected on BscScan by a stranger.

3.2 A supply that cannot be raised

Ten billion ALLI is the maximum and the total. The deployed contract contains no mint function, so no future decision, key or upgrade can increase it. Dilution risk is replaced by an emission-scheduling problem - a harder engineering problem, but an honest one, and it is addressed in §6.

3.3 Earned before traded

The primary path into ALLI is activity, not purchase. Every live application distributes tokens for verified behaviour, and onboarding requires no capital: Aura Run creates a wallet and issues a starter NFT at sign-up, free.

3.4 Disclose what is not done

The ALLI website states plainly that no third-party audit has been submitted for the contract, that Marketplace and AlliCard are not live, and that exchange liquidity is thin. This document holds to the same standard and extends it: unfinished work is named in §15 with an owner and an exit criterion rather than a date.

Two applications are live. Three further pillars are in development or stated direction. This section separates them without blurring the line.

A plain BEP-20 with nothing hidden - and an owner key that has not yet been retired.

5.1 Specification

Every field above is readable directly from the deployed contract. On-chain

5.2 What the contract does and does not contain

• Source verified. The source code is verified on BscScan with an exact bytecode match, so the published code is provably the code that runs.
• No mint function. Supply cannot be increased by any party, including the owner.
• No transfer fee. The ABI exposes no fee, tax or reflection mechanism; a transfer of n tokens delivers n tokens.
• No pause. There is no function to halt transfers.
• No blacklist. There is no function to freeze or block an individual address.
• Standard implementation. OpenZeppelin's audited ERC-20 base with the Ownable pattern, 18 decimals.

The absence of fee, pause and blacklist functions matters more than it sounds. Those three are the mechanisms behind the majority of rug-pull and honeypot contracts, and their absence is checkable in the ABI in under a minute by anyone.

5.3 The owner key

The contract uses OpenZeppelin's Ownable pattern. In a standard ERC-20 with no mint, pause, fee or blacklist functions, ownership confers narrow powers - principally the ability to transfer ownership and to call any owner-restricted function the contract defines. Because none of the dangerous owner functions listed above exist here, the practical blast radius is small.

It is not zero, and it is not nothing to a reviewer. An outstanding owner key on a token contract is a standing question at every exchange and data provider. The governance path in §10 proposes moving ownership to a multi-signature wallet and then to a timelock, with the option of renouncing entirely once no owner-restricted call remains necessary.

On-chain - the current owner address is readable from the contract's owner() view.

5.4 Market status

ALLI trades on Coinstore against USDT - the ecosystem's first exchange listing. The figures below are a point-in-time observation, not a claim about value.

Observed - market data taken from the public aggregator CoinCarp on 26 August 2026, and it will be stale by the time you read it. Verify against the live order book before trading any size. Nothing in this section is financial advice.

A fixed supply solves dilution and creates a scheduling problem in its place: ten billion tokens is a budget, and a reward economy that spends its budget has no second one.

6.1 Proposed distribution

Allocation is weighted heavily toward the reward pool, because rewards are the product. A distribution that pays team and treasury more than users would contradict the premise of the token.

6.2 Why the team allocation cliffs before the treasury vests

The team allocation is deliberately not the largest non-reward line, and it unlocks on the slowest schedule of any discretionary bucket. The purpose is to make the team's realisable position depend on the ecosystem still functioning in year four. A 12-month cliff followed by 36 months of monthly release means no founder can exit meaningfully before the reward economy has been through three annual emission steps and at least one full sink cycle.

6.3 Emission schedule

The reward pool of 4.5 billion ALLI is released on a declining curve across eight years, each year at 80% of the previous year. A declining curve front-loads acquisition when the network is small and its rewards matter most for growth, then tapers as the ecosystem is expected to fund itself from recycled sinks rather than fresh emission.

Years 1-8 release 4,493M ALLI. The residual ~7M is held as a reconciliation buffer for rounding and retroactive corrections. Emission is a ceiling, not a floor: unspent budget in a period rolls forward rather than being force-distributed.

6.4 Reward denomination - the reconciliation this model requires

This is the single most important economic point in the document, and it is the one most likely to be raised by a reviewer.

Aura Run presents its per-run rewards in USD-denominated terms across its tiers. A fixed-supply token cannot honour USD-denominated payouts at arbitrary scale: if the payout is pegged in dollars, the token quantity required per user rises as price falls, and the emission budget is consumed faster precisely when the token is weakest. At the market price observed in §5.4, a year-one budget of roughly 2.96 million ALLI per day would fund only a handful of dollar-pegged payouts.

The only sustainable resolution is that rewards are denominated in ALLI, not in dollars, with the USD figure shown in-app treated as an indicative conversion at the current rate. The proposal is therefore an explicit Emission Controller:

1. A daily reward budget is derived from the annual emission ceiling: daily_budget = annual_ceiling / 365.
2. Each qualifying user is assigned a weight equal to their tier multiplier - Leather 1×, Silver 3×, Gold 5×.
3. The day's budget is divided by the sum of weights across all users who completed the day's quest.
4. Each user receives weight × unit_share. Payout per user therefore falls as participation rises, and the budget can never be exceeded.

6.5 Sinks, and why recycling beats burning

An emission schedule that only pays out ends. Eight years after launch, a pool-and-burn design has no reward budget and no mint function with which to create one - the reward economy simply stops. The proposal is therefore to route sink revenue back into the reward pool rather than destroying it.

Sustainability target. The ecosystem should aim for recycled sink revenue to cover a rising share of the daily reward budget - a suggested gate of 25% by the end of year two and 60% by the end of year five. Below those thresholds, emission is subsidising activity that generates no return, and reward parameters should tighten rather than the budget being extended.

6.6 Circulating supply methodology

Circulating supply is the most common cause of rejection at data providers, and ALLI does not currently publish one. The proposed method is the standard subtraction, published as a page that a reviewer can re-derive from chain data:

circulating = 10,000,000,000 − unreleased rewards − unvested team − unvested treasury − unvested advisors − unvested strategic − undeployed liquidity − burned

Each subtrahend must correspond to a named, published wallet address so the figure is independently checkable. Until those addresses are disclosed, any circulating-supply number ALLI publishes is an assertion rather than a proof.

How a walk becomes a token, and exactly where the trust boundary sits.

Any move-to-earn system has an irreducible weakness: the physical world is not on-chain. A step count cannot be proven cryptographically; it can only be measured by a device and attested by a server. Being explicit about where that attestation happens is more useful than pretending it does not.

7.1 Custody

Aura Run creates a wallet automatically at sign-up, which removes the largest single drop-off in crypto onboarding - seed-phrase management before a user has anything to protect. It also means that until the user exports or withdraws, the practical custody model is closer to a hosted wallet than to self-custody, and it should be described that way rather than as "your own wallet".

Proposed disclosure standard: the applications should state, at sign-up and in-app, whether keys for auto-created wallets are held by the operator, and offer a clearly-signposted export path. Users who have never withdrawn should be told plainly that they have not yet taken custody.

7.2 Anti-cheat as an economic control

In a fixed-budget reward system, fraud is not primarily a security problem - it is a dilution problem. Every fabricated run takes tokens from honest participants in the same day's budget, because the budget is shared. This makes anti-cheat investment directly proportional to reward integrity, and it is the reason the Emission Controller in §6.4 divides a fixed pool rather than paying a fixed amount per user: a successful spoofing attack under a fixed-pool model degrades everyone's payout slightly, rather than draining the treasury outright.

Four generations of commission is an efficient acquisition mechanism and a structure that invites a specific criticism. Both are addressed here.

EggoWorld operates a separate single-tier programme paying 5% of an invited player's marketplace activity. Published